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Abstract 
 
Using data on 75 countries for six years in the period 1995 to 2003, this paper analyzes empirically 
whether and to what extent the quality of the legal system affects the performance of the labor 
market. According to the regression results, a legal system characterized by a dependent judiciary, 
biased courts, a lack of intellectual property protection and a lack of integrity increases 
unemployment and lowers the employment level. The magnitude of the effect seems to be 
substantial, particularly among young people. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The quality of the legal system is of fundamental importance for allocative efficiency and long-term 
economic development. Using data on 75 countries, this paper analyzes empirically whether and to 
what extent it affects the performance of the labor market. Do an independent judiciary, impartial 
courts and effective protection of property rights result in lower unemployment and higher 
employment? What is the impact of the quality of the legal system on those demographic groups 
that usually have above-average unemployment rates? Which aspects of the legal system‟s quality 
have the strongest effects? 
 
Whereas numerous previous studies have studied the economic effects of various individual legal 
norms, the issue mentioned above has so far been neglected. This paper is the first to analyze it. The 
following section develops working hypotheses. Section 3 briefly summarizes the results of those 
empirical studies that are relevant for this paper. Section 4 describes our data and estimation 
method. Section 5 presents and discusses the regression results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Hypotheses 
 
So far there are no theories on how the quality of the legal system affects labor market performance. 
However, there has been theorizing on its significance to long-term economic development for a 
long time. Important contributions originated from classical economics (Hume 1740, Smith 1776), 
the Austrian School (Mises 1927, Hayek 1960, 1973-79, 1989) as well as from the property rights 
approach (Alchian and Demsetz 1973, North and Thomas 1973). Based on these theories, we may 
at least develop some working hypotheses on the labor market effects.
1
 
 
According to these theoretical approaches, a legal system characterized by judicial independence, 
impartial courts and an effective protection of private property rights – i.e., by a strong rule of law 
defined in a comprehensive and substantive manner – means that the legal system does not 
deliberately discriminate against or favor any social group; that it does not unnecessarily restrict 
citizens and businesses‟ scope of action; that each individual has some assured private sphere where 
he may effectively use his knowledge and collect the fruits of his productive efforts; that the costs 
                                                 
1
 We are aware that there are differences between the theories mentioned, e.g., with respect to their assumptions 
concerning human rationality and transaction costs. However, what is decisive in our context is that there are strong 
similarities in their views on the quality of the legal system and its consequences for economic performance. 
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of taking recourse to the legal system are relatively low; and that citizens and businesses may use 
legal norms to pursue their goals. Consequently, such a legal system results in strong incentives for 
productive economic activities; the dispersed knowledge of individuals and their other resources 
being efficiently used for the benefit of society; positive externalities of innovations being 
internalized, thereby stimulating innovation and promoting economic progress; the plans and 
actions of economic agents being efficiently coordinated; social conflicts being largely avoided or 
solved at low cost; and the wasting of resources in the form of rent seeking being minimized. Thus 
resources tend to be allocated efficiently in such a legal system and economic development tends to 
be fostered, according to these theories. 
 
By contrast, if property rights are not effectively protected, if contractual claims cannot be legally 
enforced at all or only at high cost, if the government or other parties interfere with jurisdiction and 
if court decisions are biased, the incentives for productive economic activities, particularly the 
incentives to innovate and invest, are undermined. According to those theories, this results in a low 
innovation rate, modest investment and slow long-term economic growth. 
 
What are the implications for the labor market? In a legal system characterized by a strong rule of 
law, labor – like other resources – tends to be allocated efficiently so that a high employment level 
and low unemployment are achieved. Under the rule of law, people have a strong incentive to be 
gainfully employed – either self-employed or as employees – because the income they earn in their 
employment is legally secured and in case of a judicial dispute they can expect to push through any 
claims in court at relatively low cost. Correspondingly, enterprises, under the rule of law, have a 
strong incentive to hire staff since the proceeds resulting from the employment of workers are 
legally secured and they, too, can expect to be able to push through any claims in court at relatively 
low cost in case of a judicial dispute. For these reasons and as economic progress under such a legal 
regime is constantly driven forward because of the strong incentive to innovate and invest, a high 
employment level and relatively low unemployment may be anticipated in the long run as well. 
 
Conversely, a weak rule of law undermines both people‟s incentive to take up a gainful 
employment and enterprises‟ incentive to hire workers. Under such circumstances, neither the 
employed nor the enterprises can expect their claims to be legally recognized and enforceable in 
court at low cost. This may result in a relatively low level of employment and in relatively high 
unemployment. Consequently, our first working hypothesis is: the less a legal system is 
characterized by judicial independence, impartial courts and an effective protection of property 
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rights – i.e., by a strong rule of law – the higher unemployment tends to be and the lower the 
employment level, ceteris paribus. 
 
Furthermore, a legal system marked by biased courts, high costs for the enforcement of legal claims 
and arbitrary interference by the government, opposing parties or interest groups is likely to have a 
disproportionately adverse impact on the employment situation of women and youths. Such a legal 
system is typically dominated by men. They are usually predominant in trade unions, i.e., in the 
interest group that often is the most influential in the labor market. Also, most judges and attorneys 
are male. It is thus likely that in such a system the courts systematically discriminate against 
women, and possibly against youths as well. Additionally, because of their relatively weak financial 
position, women and youths in most cases are unlikely to be able to bear the high cost of the 
enforcement of their formal rights. Thus they are hardly in a position to defend themselves, e.g., 
against unjustified dismissal. By contrast, men are not only likely to be favored by such a legal 
system but are probably also able to protect their labor market position with the help of legally 
secured high market entry barriers, e.g., closed-shop regulation. Furthermore, male workers are 
likely to be able to relatively well secure their employment situation with the help of legally defined 
high market exit barriers, e.g., extensive dismissal protection regulation. Such entry and exit 
barriers have an adverse effect on women and youths; they make it harder for them to find a job 
(Lindbeck and Snower 1988). Finally, favoritism and nepotism are likely to be widespread under 
such a legal regime. Once again, men are at an advantage because they usually have the best 
connections when interesting positions are to be filled. Consequently, our second working 
hypothesis is: the less a legal system is characterized by a strong rule of law, the higher 
unemployment and the lower employment among women and youths tend to be, ceteris paribus; 
such a legal system has a disproportionately adverse impact on the employment situation of these 
demographic groups. 
 
However, our two hypotheses could be challenged by two counterhypotheses deduced from Landes 
and Posner‟s (1975) “economic theory of the independent judiciary”. This theory is based on the 
public choice approach, according to which laws are the result of competition between interest 
groups. All kinds of interest groups try to push laws through government and parliament that 
benefit them at the expense of the rest of society. In order to improve their prospects of being re-
elected, politicians meet the demands of the most important interest groups. According to Landes 
and Posner (1975), an independent judiciary interprets and applies legislation primarily in 
accordance with the original intent of the enacting legislature. It thus protects privileges that 
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influential interest groups have gained in the past and enhances their durability. The more 
independent the judiciary, the less it has to consider measures that are necessary in the public 
interest, e.g., in order to lower structural unemployment. For example, trade unions may induce 
government and parliament to enact labor laws providing far-reaching dismissal protection and high 
statutory minimum wages. The independent judiciary applies these laws in the long run and 
interprets them in an especially restrictive manner. As the influence of interest groups may impair 
allocative efficiency and labor market performance via such laws, we may deduce the following 
first counterhypothesis from Landes and Posner‟s (1975) theory: the more independent the 
judiciary, the higher unemployment and the lower employment tend to be, ceteris paribus. As far-
reaching dismissal protection, high statutory minimum wages and similar restrictive labor laws 
especially hurt women and youths and as, according to Landes and Posner (1975), an independent 
judiciary applies such laws in the long run and interprets them in an especially restrictive manner, 
we may deduce the following second counterhypothesis from their theory: the more independent the 
judiciary, the higher unemployment and the lower employment among women and youths tend to 
be, ceteris paribus; an independent judiciary has a disproportionately adverse impact on the 
employment situation of these demographic groups. 
 
 
3.  Previous empirical results 
 
Numerous empirical studies have found a legal system characterized by a strong rule of law to be of 
fundamental importance for long-term economic development. For example, a number of in-depth 
economic history studies have shown that the gradual evolution of such legal systems in Western 
Europe was a decisive precondition for the economic rise of the Western World.
2
 
 
More recently, econometric studies have also found such legal systems to exert favorable effects. 
For example, using a panel of 115 market economies and data for the period 1960 to 1980, Scully 
(1992) found that in countries that bound themselves to the rule of law and effectively protected 
private property rights, real GDP per capita grew three times as fast as in other countries. Using a 
panel of 68 countries and data for the period 1976 to 1985, Torstensson (1994) found a negative 
correlation between the presence of arbitrary seizure of property and economic growth. Using a 
panel of 97 countries and data for the period 1960 to 1989, Keefer and Knack (1997) found that the 
                                                 
2
 See particularly North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), and Landes 
(1998). 
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rule of law and the enforceability of contracts had a favorable impact on real GDP per capita 
growth. For a cross section of 57 countries, Feld and Voigt (2003) found that real GDP per capita 
grew faster if a country‟s highest court enjoyed a higher degree of de facto independence. 
 
In a similar vein, recent empirical research into the influence of legal origins on current legal 
systems and economic outcomes found that countries with a common-law origin tend to have legal 
systems that enjoy greater independence from the government (La Porta et al. 2004). They also tend 
to have less burdensome regulation (e.g., Djankov et al. 2002, Botero et al. 2004). Less burdensome 
regulation is in turn associated with better economic outcomes. For example, using a sample of 85 
countries, Botero et al. (2004) found that more flexible labor market regulation is associated with 
less unemployment, especially of the young. 
 
Up to now, the economic theory of the independent judiciary has been tested empirically in only a 
few cases and only in some of its implications. One implication is that the legislature will foster 
judicial independence, for example, by paying independent judges comparatively high salaries. 
Indeed, Anderson et al. (1989) found that, in the U.S., the salaries of state Supreme Court judges 
tended to be significantly higher, ceteris paribus, in states where the courts exhibited a high degree 
of independence in their rulings. They hypothesize that the independent judges received financial 
rewards for enhancing the durability of legislative contracts with interest groups, corroborating the 
theory. Analyzing decisions by the federal U.S. Supreme Court involving the interpretation of labor 
laws, Spiller and Gely (1992) found that a pro-union decision was significantly more likely if the 
share of liberal members in the House of Representatives was higher and if the percentage of judges 
appointed by Democratic administrations was higher. This corroborates the theory as well. More 
comprehensive empirical tests of Landes and Posner‟s (1975) theory, particularly with regard to the 
importance of judicial independence for the performance of the labor market, are still lacking. In 
general, the labor market effects of the quality of the legal system as a whole have not yet been 
analyzed empirically. So far only the effects of individual legal regulations, primarily labor market 
regulations, have been analyzed. For example, many econometric studies found that strict minimum 
wage laws lower youth employment (for a survey, see Neumark and Wascher 2007). 
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4.  Data and methodology 
4.1  Legal system quality variables 
 
To measure the quality of the legal system, this paper uses ratings from the area „legal structure and 
security of property rights‟ of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index (Gwartney and 
Lawson 2005).
3
 This area consists of five indicators: judicial independence; impartial courts; 
protection of intellectual property; military interference in rule of law and the political process; and 
integrity of the legal system. The area ratings were calculated as the arithmetic means of the ratings 
for the five indicators. 
 
The following regressions measure the quality of the legal system using the area ratings as well as 
the ratings for the five indicators. This allows us not only to analyze how the quality of the legal 
system generally affects the labor market; it also allows us to individually determine which 
characteristics have the strongest effects. 
 
The ratings for the first three indicators were calculated using results from the World Economic 
Forum‟s annual Executive Opinion Surveys (EOS). The respondents were a company‟s CEO or 
another member of its senior management. In each country approximately 60 to 70 executives were 
interviewed. The industry structure of the companies questioned corresponded largely to the 
industry structure of the relevant economy (excluding the agricultural sector). Also, care was taken 
to question companies of various size categories and types (e.g., private and state-owned, 
domestically oriented and internationally active enterprises). The participants were asked to indicate 
on a numerical scale to which extent they agree or disagree with a specific statement. With regard to 
„judicial independence‟, the statement says: “The judiciary is independent and not subject to 
interference by the government or parties in disputes.” With regard to „impartial courts‟, the 
statement says: “A trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the legality of 
government actions or regulation.” With regard to „protection of intellectual property‟, the 
statement says: “Intellectual property protection in your country is either weak or nonexistent (one 
end of the scale) or equal to the world‟s most stringent (the other end of the scale).” After the 
questioning, national averages were calculated from the answers to each question. 
 
                                                 
3
 The EFW index measures the degree of economic freedom in five major areas: (1) size of government, (2) legal 
structure and security of property rights, (3) access to sound money, (4) freedom to trade internationally, (5) regulation 
of credit, labor and business. Area 5 is divided into three components: (5A) credit market regulations, (5B) labor market 
regulations, (5C) business regulations. 
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The ratings for the last two indicators are based mainly on data from the PRS group‟s International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These data were computed from an in-house panel of experts. 
Specifically, the indicator „military interference in rule of law and the political process‟ is based 
largely on the ICRG component „military in politics‟. Gaps in the data for this indicator were filled 
using the „political stability and absence of violence‟ ratings from the World Bank‟s „governance 
indicators project‟. The indicator „integrity of the legal system‟ is based on the ICRG component 
„law and order‟, which assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as popular 
observance of the law. 
 
The main advantage of the last two indicators is that they are based on the assessments of 
experienced analysts. The main advantage of the first three indicators is that the selection of 
respondents for the EOS was largely representative and that the respondents had practical 
experience with the legal systems of their countries of residence. Furthermore, the EOS statements 
are phrased objectively and permit a better coverage of the various characteristics of the legal 
system than hard data. Indeed, given that the quality of the legal system is determined by both a 
large number of institutions – organizations, laws, public decrees, court rulings as well as informal 
norms – and by the way laws, public decrees and court rulings are enforced, it is impossible to 
develop objective indicators that capture all the relevant aspects. For example, informal norms and 
the enforcement of formal rules cannot be captured at all by hard data. 
 
Of course, the Executive Opinion Surveys have some potential drawbacks. One cause of concern is 
that each respondent may have used his own yardstick when answering the questions. However, in 
the planning, implementation and analysis of the surveys, care was taken to ensure the use of a 
uniform yardstick. For example, the respondents were provided with a written explanation of the 
numerical scale. Also, the answers were examined for robustness and consistency using various 
methods. In one of these checks, half of the answers from each country were randomly dropped 
from the sample. As the national EOS scores remained stable in the process, they have obviously 
not been distorted by individual peculiarities in responding (e.g., Cornelius and McArthur 2002, pp. 
169-173). 
 
Another potential weakness of the EOS data is that the executives were neither legal experts nor 
country experts. Even worse, their opinions on the quality of the legal system may have been 
biased. For these reasons, the survey results may not accurately reflect its quality. 
 
 10 
In order to check whether the EOS data are biased, we compare the respective EFW ratings with 
related data from other sources: 
– The EFW indicator „judicial independence‟ was correlated with the index of de facto judicial 
independence constructed by Feld and Voigt (2003).
4
 For each country, the index measures the 
de facto independence of the respective highest court on average over the period 1960 to 2000. 
Higher values on the 0-to-1 scale indicate more independence. Information was acquired via a 
survey among legal and country experts (law professors, lawyers, judges and activists from 
organizations such as Transparency International). The survey questions focused on verifiable 
facts rather than subjective evaluations. Data are available for 59 of our 75 countries. The 
correlation coefficient between the EFW indicator „judicial independence‟, for which we used 
averages over 1995 and 2000
5
, and the Feld-Voigt index is 0.52. Thus in countries with a more 
independent highest court, more managers thought that the judiciary is independent and not 
subject to interference by the government or parties in disputes. Indeed, the correlation is 
remarkably close, given that there are two substantial differences between the two indices. First, 
whereas the EOS statement refers to the judiciary as a whole, the Feld-Voigt index refers to the 
highest court only. Second, whereas the EFW data are averages over 1995 and 2000, the Feld-
Voigt index refers to the period 1960 to 2000. 
– The EFW indicator „impartial courts‟ was correlated with the EFW indicator „integrity of the 
legal system‟. Whereas the former is based on the Executive Opinion Surveys, the latter is based 
on assessments of experts of the PRS group. As explained above, both indicators focus on 
similar features of the legal system. Based on data for the years 1995 and 2000 to 2003, the 
correlation coefficient is 0.65. Thus in countries with strong and impartial legal systems and 
widespread observance of the law (according to the PRS group‟s experts), many respondents of 
the EOS thought that a trusted legal framework exists for private businesses to challenge the 
legality of government actions or regulation. As with the previous check, the correlation 
coefficient is remarkably high, given that although both indicators focus on similar 
characteristics, there are still substantial differences between them. 
– The EFW indicator „protection of intellectual property‟ was correlated with the subindex 
„property rights‟ from the Heritage Foundation‟s Index of Economic Freedom (Holmes et al. 
2008). This subindex scores the legal protection of private property rights and the chances of 
government expropriation of property. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the 
maximum protection of private property rights. Scores were assigned by the authors of the 
Heritage Foundation‟s Index of Economic Freedom, based on publications from the Economist 
                                                 
4
 Stefan Voigt kindly provided us with a revised version of the index. 
5
 Neither data on years prior to 1995 nor data on the years 1996 to 1999 are available for this indicator (see section 4.3). 
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Intelligence Unit and the U.S. government. Data are available for all 75 countries included in 
our sample. Using data for the years 2000 to 2003, the correlation coefficient is 0.84, clearly 
indicating that in countries with well protected private property rights (according to the Heritage 
Foundation‟s subindex), many managers believed that intellectual property protection is equal to 
the world‟s most stringent. 
 
All in all, the subjective data from the Executive Opinion Surveys appear to be well suited for 
analyzing the impact of the quality of the legal system on labor market performance. To be sure, as 
pointed out previously, they have certain limitations. However, as also pointed out previously, 
objective measures have shortcomings of their own. The judgments of high-level business 
executives, as recorded in the Executive Opinion Surveys, provide an alternative characterization 
that may shed useful light on the labor market effects of the legal system. 
 
The rating scale of the EFW index ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 representing the lowest and 10 the 
highest degree of economic freedom. In the area „legal structure and security of property rights‟, 
higher ratings always indicate a stronger rule of law (i.e., a more independent judiciary, a better 
protection of property rights, and so on). In order to avoid small absolute values for the regression 
coefficients, we divided all EFW ratings by 10. 
 
As higher marks on the scale indicate a higher quality of the legal system, we label the variable that 
is based on the aggregate „legal structure and security of property rights‟ index „legal system 
quality‟. Similarly, we label the variable that is based on the indicator „military interference in rule 
of law and the political process‟ „no or little military interference‟. 
 
 
4.2  Dependent and control variables 
 
To measure the effects on the labor market, this paper uses both the unemployment and the 
employment rate (for definitions and sources of all dependent and control variables, see Appendix 
A). The unemployment rate is the most important and best-known labor market measure. However, 
for two reasons it may be insufficient to measure labor market slack. First, many workers in 
developing countries can simply not afford to be unemployed since many of these countries lack a 
social safety net. Second, in some, particularly industrial countries, governments try to hide the true 
extent of unemployment by offering unemployed workers generous disability or early retirement 
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benefits. Therefore, we additionally use the employment rate. Furthermore, we measure the effects 
on the percentage share of long-term unemployed in the total number of unemployed; a large share 
of long-term unemployment clearly indicates that the labor market operates inefficiently. 
 
We use both unemployment and employment rates for the total working-age population as well as 
for women and young people. This enables us to determine not only whether the quality of the legal 
system affects the overall level of unemployment and employment but also to what extent it affects 
women and youths. Thus our dependent variables allow us to test our working hypotheses as well as 
the counterhypotheses. 
 
Most of our labor market performance data come from the ILO‟s (2005) Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market. They are based on labor force survey data. Thus the unemployment data, for 
example, do not refer to registered unemployment. Instead they are based on an international 
standard which defines the unemployed as all persons above a specific age who, during the 
reference period, were without work, currently available for work and seeking work. Although 
national coverage of unemployment can vary with regard to factors such as age limits and criteria 
for seeking work, the ILO has undertaken great efforts to produce series that are comparable across 
countries. With regard to age limits, for example, most national series presented in this publication 
refer to the age group 15 years and older. This applies both to unemployment and employment 
rates. Furthermore, the ILO has „cleaned‟ the national time series to eliminate breaks in series. Thus 
these data are comparable over time. Although the ILO‟s labor market performance data are not 
completely harmonized across countries, they are harmonized to a large extent. 
 
We control for the impact of labor market regulations by using the ratings for the respective 
component from the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index (Gwartney and Lawson 2005). 
As previous empirical studies indicate, certain labor market regulations appear to have a 
considerable impact on the performance of the labor market.
6
 The EFW variable „labor market 
regulations‟ covers the following regulations: statutory minimum wage, hiring and firing 
regulations, centralization of collective bargaining, unemployment benefits, and military 
conscription. As higher marks on the scale indicate more flexible regulation, we label this control 
„flexible labor market regulations‟ (rather than „labor market regulations‟). 
 
                                                 
6
 In addition to the studies mentioned in section 3, see, e.g., Feldmann (2003, 2005, 2009a), Nickell et al. (2005) and 
Bassanini and Duval (2006). 
 13 
We control for the impact of the tax burden by using the EFW indicator „top marginal tax rate‟. It is 
based on the top marginal income and payroll tax rate and on the income threshold at which the top 
marginal income tax rate applies. As higher values on the scale represent lower marginal tax rates 
and higher income thresholds, we label this variable „low top marginal tax rate‟. Previous studies 
have found that a heavy tax burden is likely to lower employment and increase unemployment in 
industrial countries (e.g., Prescott 2004, Feldmann 2006a).
7
 
 
We use the GDP growth rate plus year dummies to simultaneously control for business cycle 
fluctuations and shocks that are common across countries (e.g., oil-price shocks).
8
 For two reasons, 
we additionally control for GDP per capita. First, it is important to account for the effects of the 
huge cross-country differences in the level of economic development. Second, as richer countries 
usually enjoy a stronger rule of law, it is also important to ensure that our legal system quality 
variables do not proxy for the level of economic development. 
 
Furthermore, we use two variables to control for the impact of geographical conditions. In a series 
of papers, Sachs and coauthors have shown that both levels and growth rates of GDP per capita are 
lower in countries that are characterized by adverse geographical conditions (e.g., Gallup et al. 
1999, Sachs 2001). Our first geographical control is the share of land area in geographical tropics. 
Sachs and coauthors argue that tropical climates hinder production and development. One may thus 
hypothesize that they may also worsen labor market performance, particularly lowering 
employment rates. However, there may be a compensating effect: more people may have a job in 
order to compensate for the low level of labor productivity, in general, and for frequent illness of 
members of their families, in particular. While low levels of labor productivity imply low wages, 
frequent illness of family members renders family income unstable. If the compensation effect 
dominates, countries with (a larger share of) tropical areas may have higher employment and lower 
unemployment rates, ceteris paribus. Indeed, using data on 76 countries, Feldmann (2009b) found 
evidence for the latter. 
 
                                                 
7
 The tax burden on labor („tax wedge‟) would have been a preferable indicator. However, data on this indicator are 
available for industrial countries only. The EFW indicator „top marginal tax rate‟ can be regarded as a proxy for the tax 
burden on labor, because countries with a large (small) tax wedge usually also have a high (low) top marginal income 
and payroll tax rate and a low (high) income threshold at which the top marginal income tax rate applies. Indeed, the 
correlation coefficient between the „tax wedge‟ and the EFW indicator „top marginal tax rate‟ is 0.66, indicating that 
larger tax wedges are associated with higher top marginal income and payroll tax rates and lower income thresholds at 
which top marginal income tax rates apply. [The calculation of the correlation coefficient is based on data for 20 
industrial countries and for the years 1995 and 2000 to 2003. The source for the „tax wedge‟ data is OECD (various 
issues).] 
8
 The output gap would have been the best indicator to control for the impact of business cycle fluctuations. However, 
data on this variable are also available for industrial countries only. 
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Our second geographical control is the mean distance to the nearest ice-free coastline. A long 
distance is likely to increase transport costs for international trade, thus lowering employment levels 
and possibly increasing unemployment. Alternatively, one may argue that access to the sea may be 
almost irrelevant and that road, railway, airline and telecommunications networks may be much 
more important instead. One may even argue that a long distance to the coast may induce people to 
compensate for this natural disadvantage by working more, raising employment and lowering 
unemployment. 
 
We also control for ethnic fractionalization, hypothesizing that it adversely affects labor market 
performance. For example, members of ethnic minorities may be discriminated against when it 
comes to hiring and firing. Furthermore, the ruling group may implement policies that discriminate 
against industries dominated by the losing groups. They may also pursue policies, such as financial 
repression and overvalued exchange rates, that create rents for themselves at the expense of society 
at large. All of this is likely to lower employment and increase unemployment. Using data on more 
than 70 countries, Feldmann (2006b, 2008, 2009b) found evidence corroborating this hypothesis. 
 
Additionally, we employ a control variable for interstate and internal wars because they may 
severely disrupt the labor markets of the countries in which they take place. We also use a dummy 
variable for those countries that are in transition from planned to market economy since this process 
has a major impact on their labor markets. Finally, in the regressions to explain the youth 
employment rate, we employ the tertiary enrollment rate. As previous studies both on transition and 
industrial countries indicate, countries with a higher percentage of young people enrolled in tertiary 
education have a lower percentage of young people in employment (Feldmann 2005, 2006c). 
 
 
4.3  Sample and methodology 
 
Our estimation sample consists of 75 industrial, developing and transition countries (for a list of 
countries, see Appendix B). As most previous cross-country labor market studies cover OECD 
countries only (usually 20 or less), it is exceptionally large. 
 
The EFW index has been calculated from 1970 on for every fifth year plus for the years 2001 to 
2003. As the ratings for the individual components of the area „legal structure and security of 
property rights‟ were only published for the years from 1995, and as some of our explanatory 
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variables were lagged by one year (see below), our regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 
1996 and 2000 to 2003. 
 
We estimate the following model: 
 
Yit = α + β1Xit-1 + β2Lit-1 + β3Tit-1 + β4Git-1 + β5Cit + β6Ait + β7Dit + β8Eit + β9Wit + β10Pit + λt + εit , 
 
where Yit is a labor market performance variable of country i at year t, α is a constant, X denotes a 
legal system quality variable, L is our labor market regulations variable, T denotes the variable „low 
top marginal tax rate‟, G is the „GDP growth‟ variable, C denotes „GDP per capita‟, A is the 
„tropical area‟ variable, D denotes „distance to coastline‟, E is the „ethnic fractionalization‟ variable, 
W denotes the „war‟ variable, P is our „transition country‟ dummy , while λt denotes year dummies 
and εit is the error term.
9
 
 
As there is substantial correlation among the legal system quality variables, we estimate 
specifications that include these measures one at a time. Furthermore, the legal system quality 
variables as well as the variables „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal tax rate‟ and 
„GDP growth‟ were lagged by one year to allow for slow adjustment and to avoid simultaneity 
problems. Changes in the quality of the legal system are likely to affect the performance of the labor 
market only after some time. The same can be expected from changes in labor market regulation 
and tax policies. Also, labor market performance usually responds to changes in the GDP growth 
rate only after about one year. 
 
We control for the impact of unobserved country effects since it is impossible to include control 
variables for all country-specific characteristics resulting in international differences in labor market 
performance (for example, cultural norms concerning female labor force participation). To control 
for unobserved country effects, we use the random effects, feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) procedure, specifically, the Swamy-Arora (1972) estimator that is cited most often in 
textbooks (e.g., Baltagi 2001). Random effects estimates have the advantage of exploiting both the 
cross-country and the time-series variation included in the sample. By contrast, fixed effects 
estimates would be very imprecise because they only use the time-series variation within the 
sample. 
 
                                                 
9
 The model to explain the youth employment rate additionally includes the „tertiary enrollment rate‟ variable. 
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The error term εit can be decomposed as  
 
εit = wi + uit , 
 
where wi denotes time-invariant country-specific characteristics and uit is the combined time-series 
and cross-section error term. The random effects estimation treats the country-specific effects (wi) 
as random. However, it requires that they are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included 
in the estimated equation. If this condition is violated, the random effects FGLS estimator yields 
inconsistent estimates. Therefore, a Hausman (1978) test for misspecification of the random effects 
model has been performed for each regression. As the results from this test indicate, none of our 
estimates is biased (Tables 1 to 7). Thus, in our case the random effects FGLS method is the 
appropriate choice. Finally, to correct for heteroskedasticity, we estimate robust t-statistics using the 
technique developed by White (1980). 
 
 
5.  Results 
 
Tables 1 to 7 present our regressions to explain our labor market performance variables. In each 
table, the first column reports a regression that was estimated using the „legal system quality‟ 
variable, which is based on the aggregate „legal structure and security of property rights‟ index. 
Subsequent regressions, reported in columns 2 to 6 of each table, were estimated using the variables 
that are based on the individual indicators of this index. 
 
Except for the regression to explain the youth employment rate, all estimates for the „legal system 
quality‟ variable are statistically insignificant (Tables 1 to 7). According to Table 7, a stronger rule 
of law, as measured by this variable, is associated with a higher rate of employment among young 
people. 
 
The estimates for the five variables measuring specific aspects of legal system quality provide 
differentiated insights into the importance of such characteristics to the labor market. The regression 
analysis produced the following results: 
– Less judicial independence is associated with a lower level of employment among the total 
working-age population as well as among women and youths (Tables 5 to 7). It is also 
associated with a larger share of long-term unemployment (Table 4). 
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– More biased court decisions are correlated with a lower level of employment among the young 
(Table 7). 
– Less protection of intellectual property is associated with higher unemployment among the total 
labor force as well as among women and youths (Tables 1 to 3). Furthermore, it is associated 
with lower employment among young people (Table 7). 
– Countries that are characterized by more frequent military interference in the rule of law and the 
political process have lower unemployment rates, both among the total labor force and among 
the two demographic groups (Tables 1 to 3). They also have less long-term unemployment 
(Table 4). Furthermore, they have a higher rate of youth employment (Table 7). 
– As the legal system looses its integrity, the rate of employment falls among the total working-
age population as well as among women and youths (Tables 5 to 7). Additionally, both the 
youth unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rise (Tables 3 and 4). 
 
Thus judicial independence, intellectual property protection, military interference and the integrity 
of the legal system most clearly appear to affect labor market performance. The magnitude of the 
effects seems to be substantial. For example, compare the Netherlands and Ecuador. The 
Netherlands achieved one of the best results in the area „legal structure and security of property 
rights‟. On average over the years 1995 and 2000 to 2002, its area rating was 9.2. Ecuador‟s 
average area rating, at 3.3, was much lower. Ecuador also had much higher unemployment rates and 
much lower employment rates, both among the total population and among the women and youths. 
On average over the years 1996 and 2001 to 2003, the Dutch unemployment rate amounted to 4.2% 
whereas the Ecuadorian unemployment rate was 10.4%. Similarly, while the Dutch employment 
rate averaged 60.4%, Ecuador‟s employment rate averaged 53.9%. 
 
According to our estimates, if the Ecuadorian judiciary had been as independent as the Dutch 
judiciary, Ecuador might have been able to close 35% of the gap between the two countries‟ 
employment rates, ceteris paribus. If protection of intellectual property in Ecuador had been as strict 
as in the Netherlands, Ecuador might have been able to close 38% of the gap between the two 
countries‟ unemployment rates, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, if the Ecuadorian legal system had 
enjoyed the same degree of integrity as the Dutch legal system, Ecuador might have been able to 
close 24% of the gap between the two countries‟ employment rates, ceteris paribus. On the other 
hand, the Ecuadorian labor market may have benefited from military interference in the rule of law 
and the political process. Specifically, if Ecuador had achieved the same score for the indicator 
„military interference‟ as the Netherlands, its unemployment rate might have been 2.3 percentage 
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points higher, ceteris paribus. Of course, these figures should be interpreted with some caution. 
However, they illustrate that the quality of the legal system is likely to have a substantial impact on 
the performance of the labor market. 
 
We also checked the robustness of our regression results. In a first check, we normalized each 
country‟s GDP growth rate during the current year for its average growth rate over the previous ten 
years and substituted this new variable for the lagged GDP growth rate. In a second check, we 
substituted a dummy variable for developing countries (the latter defined as low and middle income 
countries according to the World Bank classification) for the „GDP per capita‟ variable. In a third 
check, we additionally controlled for the percentage share of children in the population. In a fourth 
check, we dropped the two geographical controls, and in a fifth the variables „ethnic 
fractionalization‟ and „war‟. In further robustness checks, we excluded from the sample statistical 
outliers, or any particular country, or any random draw of 10% of observations. None of these 
checks had any substantial impact on the coefficients on our variables of interest (results not 
reported here). 
 
As is obvious from the results of our baseline regressions presented in Tables 1 to 7, most of our 
estimates corroborate the working hypotheses developed in section 2. They suggest that a legal 
system characterized by judicial dependence, biased courts, a lack of intellectual property protection 
and a lack of integrity is likely to adversely affect the performance of the labor market. For the 
reasons given in section 2, this is probably mainly because such a system weakens the incentives to 
supply and demand labor, lowers allocative efficiency and reduces long-term economic growth.
10
 
As far as young people are concerned, the regression results also corroborate our second working 
hypothesis. The absolute values of the coefficients on „judicial independence‟, „protection of 
intellectual property‟ and „integrity of the legal system‟ are substantially higher in the regressions to 
explain unemployment and employment among youths than in the respective regressions to explain 
unemployment and employment among the overall working-age population (Tables 1, 3, 5, 7). Thus 
young people indeed appear to be more severely affected by a weak rule of law. By contrast, the 
absolute values of the respective coefficients in the regressions to explain unemployment and 
employment among women are not exceptionally high (Tables 1, 2, 5, 6), indicating that there 
appears to be no above-average effect on this demographic group. 
 
                                                 
10
 Note that these estimates are also in line with previous empirical studies that have found a strong rule of law to exert 
a favorable impact on economic development. 
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Our regression results do not corroborate the two counterhypotheses deduced from the economic 
theory of the independent judiciary. According to our results, more judicial independence does not 
deteriorate but improve the performance of the labor market. This is true with respect to the general 
working-age population as well as with respect to women and youths. Although, as is obvious from 
both our coefficients on the variable „flexible labor market regulations‟ (Tables 1 to 7) and previous 
labor market regulation studies (section 3 and footnote 6), restrictive labor laws are likely to worsen 
labor market outcomes, an increase in judicial independence does not lead to a further worsening, as 
stated in the counterhypotheses. On the contrary, it leads to an improvement. The causal connection 
stated in our working hypotheses is probably decisive here. 
 
Surprisingly, our estimates indicate that more military interference in the rule of law and the 
political process is correlated with better rather than worse labor market performance. The reason 
for this may be that, in developing countries, the economy may actually perform better if the 
military intervenes in the legal and political system to fight corruption, anarchy or arbitrary rule. 
However, there are not many cases in which military intervention was actually instrumental in this 
regard. 
 
Finally, let us briefly comment on our estimates for the control variables: 
– In line with most previous labor market regulation studies (see section 3 and footnote 6), we 
find that more flexible regulations appear to lower unemployment, both among the total labor 
force as well as among female and young workers (Tables 1 to 3), and that they appear to 
increase employment among the young (Table 7). 
– Lower taxes also seem to increase youth employment (Table 7). Additionally, there is some, 
albeit weak, evidence that they lower unemployment (Tables 1 to 4). 
– A higher GDP growth rate in the previous year is strongly correlated with lower unemployment 
in the current year, both among the overall labor force as well as among the two demographic 
groups (Tables 1 to 3). Furthermore, it is associated with a higher employment rate (Table 5). 
– A higher level of economic development is associated with lower unemployment rates (Tables 1 
to 3). Furthermore, it is associated with higher employment rates, particularly among women 
(Tables 5 and 6). 
– The coefficient on „tropical area‟ indicates that countries with a larger share of tropical area 
have less unemployment and higher employment rates (Tables 1 to 7). Thus the compensation 
effect mentioned in section 4.2 seems to dominate. 
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– A long distance to the coast also seems to exert a compensation effect. According to our results, 
a longer distance is correlated with lower unemployment rates and less long-term 
unemployment (Tables 1 to 4). There is also some non-robust evidence that it is associated with 
higher employment rates (Tables 5 to 7). 
– Ethnic fractionalization appears to increase unemployment and lower employment (Tables 1 to 
7), corroborating our hypothesis (section 4.2). 
– Finally, in line with previous studies (e.g., Feldmann 2003), we find that female employment is 
comparatively high in transition countries (Table 6). 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The regression results indicate that the quality of the legal system is likely to affect the performance 
of the labor market. According to our estimates, a legal system characterized by a dependent 
judiciary, biased courts, a lack of intellectual property protection and a lack of integrity is likely to 
raise unemployment and reduce employment. Apparently, it has a particularly adverse impact on 
young people. The effect on women does not appear to be larger than the effect on the overall 
population. Furthermore, we find countries that are characterized by more frequent military 
interference in the rule of law and the political process to have lower unemployment rates and less 
long-term unemployment, ceteris paribus. Our results are robust to variations in specification and 
sample size. The magnitude of the estimated effects seems to be substantial. 
 
As this is the first study to analyze empirically the labor market effects of legal system quality, 
more research is clearly warranted. For example, as most of the EFW indicators are based on 
surveys among managers, future research should use alternative indicators. Furthermore, future 
studies should cover longer time spans. Additionally, the transmission channels from legal system 
quality to labor market performance need to be more closely examined, both theoretically and 
empirically. It also needs to be analyzed in more detail why young people seem to benefit 
disproportionately from a strong rule of law. The labor market effects of military interference need 
to be investigated in more detail as well. 
 
Finally, the policy implications of our findings need to be thoroughly discussed. In general, it seems 
obvious to conclude that parliament and government should strengthen the rule of law as part of 
their policy-mix to improve labor market performance. However, various aspects of the policy 
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implications need to be closely scrutinized in order to be able to come up with more specific 
recommendations. For example, what measures should be implemented to increase the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary? What procedures should be in place to challenge the 
legality of government actions and regulation? How can the protection of intellectual property 
rights be best secured? What measures are most efficient to reduce the crime rate? In tackling these 
questions, it is important to take the specific characteristics of the relevant country thoroughly into 
account, not only with respect to its legal system but also with respect to its political and economic 
system. 
 
 
Appendix A.  Dependent and control variables – definitions and sources 
 
I. Dependent variables 
 
Unemployment rate: Unemployed as a percentage of the labor force. Labor force survey data. 
Source: International Labour Office (2005). 
Female unemployment rate: Unemployed women as a percentage of the female labor force. Labor 
force survey data. Source: International Labour Office (2005). 
Youth unemployment rate: Unemployed aged 15 to 24 years as a percentage of the labor force in 
the same age bracket. Labor force survey data. Source: European Commission (2005), 
International Labour Office (2005). 
Long-term unemployment: Unemployed with an unemployment duration of 12 months and more as 
a percentage of total unemployment. Labor force survey data. Source: European 
Commission (2005), International Labour Office (2005), OECD (2005), author‟s 
calculations. 
Employment rate: Percentage of working-age population in employment. Labor force survey data. 
Source: International Labour Office (2005). 
Female employment rate: Percentage of female working-age population in employment. Labor 
force survey data. Source: International Labour Office (2005). 
Youth employment rate: Employed aged 15 to 24 years as a percentage of the population in the 
same age bracket. Labor force survey data. Source: European Commission (2005), OECD 
(2005). 
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II. Control variables 
 
Flexible labor market regulations: Subindex „labor market regulations‟ of the Economic Freedom of 
the World index, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate more flexible 
regulation. The subindex consists of five indicators. The ratings for the first four indicators 
are based on results from the World Economic Forum‟s annual Executive Opinion Surveys. 
The participants were asked to indicate on a numerical scale to what extent they agree or 
disagree with a specific statement. The four survey statements are: “The minimum wage, set 
by law, has little impact on wages because it is too low or not obeyed”; “Hiring and firing 
practices of companies are determined by private contract”; “The share of labor force whose 
wages are set by centralized collective bargaining is low”; and “The unemployment benefits 
system preserves the incentives to work.” The fifth indicator, „military conscription‟, 
measures the use of conscripts to obtain military personnel, including duration of military 
conscription. All indicators carry equal weights. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
Low top marginal tax rate: Subindex „top marginal tax rate‟ of the Economic Freedom of the World 
index, scaled to take values between 0 and 1. Higher values indicate lower top marginal 
income and payroll tax rates and higher income thresholds at which the top marginal income 
tax rates apply. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005). 
GDP growth: Annual percentage growth rate of real GDP. Source: World Bank (2006). 
GDP per capita: Gross domestic product per capita, converted to constant 2000 international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates, divided by 1,000. Source: Directorate-General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics (2005), World Bank (2006). 
Tropical area: Share of land area in geographical tropics. Source: Center for International 
Development (1999, 2001). 
Distance to coastline: Mean distance to nearest ice-free coastline, measured in thousands of 
kilometers. Source: Center for International Development (2001), author‟s calculations. 
Ethnic fractionalization: One minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group shares, reflecting the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different 
groups. The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic 
characteristics. The classifications reflect the judgments of ethnologists and anthropologists 
on the appropriate definition of ethnicity. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
War: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if, in the respective year, there was an interstate or 
internal war in the country. Source: Centre for the Study of Civil War (2005). 
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Transition country: Dummy variable for countries in transition from centrally planned to market 
economy. 
Tertiary enrollment rate: Students enrolled in tertiary education, regardless of age, as a share of the 
population of the age group that officially corresponds to this level of education. Source: 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (2005), World Bank (2006). 
 
 
Appendix B.  List of countries 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. 
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Table 1. Regressions to explain the unemployment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality 0.88 
(0.31) 
     
Judicial independence  0.90 
(0.89) 
    
Impartial courts   0.90 
(0.54) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   -4.12*** 
(-4.09) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    3.75** 
(2.58) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     -0.30 
(-0.36) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
-5.56* 
(-1.68) 
-5.37* 
(-1.86) 
-5.68** 
(-1.99) 
-3.66 
(-1.39) 
-5.98** 
(-2.28) 
-5.29* 
(-1.95) 
Low top marginal tax rate -2.06 
(-1.36) 
-2.39 
(-1.52) 
-1.99 
(-1.29) 
-2.51* 
(-1.78) 
-2.05 
(-1.15) 
-2.11 
(-1.23) 
GDP growth -0.19*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.48) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.96) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.20*** 
(-3.30) 
GDP per capita -0.28** 
(-2.52) 
-0.27*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.27*** 
(-2.76) 
-0.23*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.30*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.26*** 
(-2.82) 
Tropical area -4.41*** 
(-3.13) 
-4.67*** 
(-3.16) 
-4.43*** 
(-2.77) 
-5.00*** 
(-3.19) 
-4.00** 
(-2.38) 
-4.50*** 
(-2.96) 
Distance to coastline -1.74** 
(-2.12) 
-1.39** 
(-2.04) 
-1.78** 
(-2.25) 
-1.86** 
(-2.28) 
-1.39* 
(-1.71) 
-1.71* 
(-1.81) 
Ethnic fractionalization 6.41*** 
(3.92) 
6.16*** 
(3.34) 
6.41*** 
(3.57) 
6.20*** 
(4.16) 
6.62*** 
(5.88) 
6.28*** 
(3.23) 
War -0.27 
(-0.34) 
-0.15 
(-0.14) 
-0.33 
(-0.36) 
-0.33 
(-0.42) 
-0.19 
(-0.26) 
-0.15 
(-0.19) 
Transition country 0.06 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(-0.04) 
0.16 
(0.07) 
-0.59 
(-0.25) 
-0.37 
(-0.15) 
0.10 
(0.05) 
Number of observations 249 235 249 249 249 248 
Number of countries 74 72 74 74 74 74 
R² 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
1.66 
 
1.67 
 
1.66 
 
1.64 
 
1.64 
 
1.67 
F-statistic 6.08*** 6.19*** 6.10*** 6.48*** 6.61*** 6.12*** 
Hausman test 7.77 7.83 7.81 8.85 6.33 9.76 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
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Table 2. Regressions to explain the female unemployment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality 1.03 
(0.30) 
     
Judicial independence  0.16 
(0.24) 
    
Impartial courts   0.57 
(0.43) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   -3.03** 
(-2.35) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    4.87*** 
(2.70) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     -0.31 
(-0.27) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
-9.56** 
(-2.18) 
-9.40*** 
(-2.96) 
-9.52** 
(-2.44) 
-7.80** 
(-2.10) 
-10.00*** 
(-2.94) 
-9.30** 
(-2.53) 
Low top marginal tax rate -2.57 
(-1.44) 
-2.89 
(-1.53) 
-2.55 
(-1.40) 
-2.93* 
(-1.75) 
-2.63 
(-1.28) 
-2.58 
(-1.30) 
GDP growth -0.16** 
(-2.49) 
-0.16** 
(-2.44) 
-0.16** 
(-2.48) 
-0.16*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.17** 
(-2.57) 
-0.18** 
(-2.40) 
GDP per capita -0.32** 
(-2.26) 
-0.31** 
(-2.53) 
-0.32** 
(-2.40) 
-0.29** 
(-2.35) 
-0.35** 
(-2.30) 
-0.31** 
(-2.54) 
Tropical area -4.21** 
(-2.07) 
-5.01** 
(-2.18) 
-4.30* 
(-1.87) 
-4.77** 
(-2.05) 
-3.57 
(-1.38) 
-4.34* 
(-1.91) 
Distance to coastline -1.79** 
(-2.31) 
-1.31*** 
(-2.75) 
-1.83** 
(-2.24) 
-1.93** 
(-2.27) 
-1.38** 
(-2.18) 
-1.73* 
(-1.83) 
Ethnic fractionalization 7.31*** 
(4.25) 
7.04*** 
(3.54) 
7.26*** 
(3.79) 
7.18*** 
(4.33) 
7.70*** 
(5.48) 
7.15*** 
(3.23) 
War -0.47 
(-0.49) 
-0.21 
(-0.18) 
-0.50 
(-0.50) 
-0.50 
(-0.55) 
-0.39 
(-0.44) 
-0.27 
(-0.32) 
Transition country -1.25 
(-0.50) 
-1.52 
(-0.57) 
-1.23 
(-0.48) 
-1.81 
(-0.67) 
-1.78 
(-0.61) 
-1.20 
(-0.48) 
Number of observations 240 227 240 240 240 239 
Number of countries 73 71 73 73 73 73 
R² 0.25 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
1.79 
 
1.80 
 
1.79 
 
1.79 
 
1.76 
 
1.82 
F-statistic 5.88*** 6.00*** 5.88*** 6.04*** 6.50*** 5.96*** 
Hausman test 5.92 5.80 5.82 5.33 5.34 8.50 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
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Table 3. Regressions to explain the youth unemployment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality -3.45 
(-0.82) 
     
Judicial independence  0.79 
(0.59) 
    
Impartial courts   0.21 
(0.07) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   -6.76** 
(-2.56) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    6.28** 
(2.29) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     -4.78** 
(-2.06) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
-10.73* 
(-1.65) 
-11.81** 
(-2.14) 
-11.91* 
(-1.81) 
-9.06 
(-1.53) 
-13.24** 
(-2.18) 
-10.94** 
(-1.97) 
Low top marginal tax rate -2.65 
(-1.05) 
-2.43 
(-0.86) 
-2.48 
(-0.99) 
-3.14 
(-1.41) 
-2.39 
(-0.79) 
-2.25 
(-0.85) 
GDP growth -0.40*** 
(-4.84) 
-0.39*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.40*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.40*** 
(-5.12) 
-0.40*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.42*** 
(-4.99) 
GDP per capita -0.44** 
(-2.40) 
-0.49*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.47*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.42** 
(-2.46) 
-0.52*** 
(-2.62) 
-0.42** 
(-2.40) 
Tropical area -8.56*** 
(-3.25) 
-7.97** 
(-2.31) 
-7.95*** 
(-2.94) 
-8.82*** 
(-2.83) 
-6.86** 
(-2.40) 
-8.87*** 
(-3.16) 
Distance to coastline -3.54** 
(-2.54) 
-2.49*** 
(-3.36) 
-3.39** 
(-2.50) 
-3.60*** 
(-3.12) 
-2.67* 
(-1.91) 
-3.69*** 
(-4.42) 
Ethnic fractionalization 10.75*** 
(3.14) 
10.06** 
(2.20) 
11.04*** 
(3.02) 
11.07*** 
(3.31) 
11.58*** 
(2.98) 
10.54*** 
(2.85) 
War -1.69 
(-1.17) 
-1.57 
(-1.18) 
-1.64 
(-1.16) 
-1.31 
(-0.98) 
-1.49 
(-1.48) 
-2.34 
(-1.12) 
Transition country 1.41 
(0.25) 
1.37 
(0.21) 
1.73 
(0.31) 
0.60 
(0.10) 
1.10 
(0.18) 
1.97 
(0.37) 
Number of observations 205 195 205 205 205 204 
Number of countries 66 65 66 66 66 65 
R² 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
3.24 
 
3.23 
 
3.24 
 
3.22 
 
3.22 
 
3.26 
F-statistic 7.01*** 7.15*** 6.96*** 7.19*** 7.24*** 7.25*** 
Hausman test 3.59 3.29 3.71 3.20 3.24 7.72 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
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Table 4. Regressions to explain long-term unemployment
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality -17.16 
(-0.97) 
     
Judicial independence  -15.44* 
(-1.72) 
    
Impartial courts   1.44 
(0.10) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   -5.56 
(-0.33) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    26.95*** 
(3.94) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     -14.84*** 
(-4.24) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
-12.85 
(-1.33) 
-8.27 
(-1.03) 
-17.72 
(-1.63) 
-14.54 
(-1.15) 
-19.94*** 
(-2.88) 
-17.46** 
(-2.47) 
Low top marginal tax rate -6.91 
(-1.60) 
-8.86** 
(-2.07) 
-6.60* 
(-1.78) 
-7.07 
(-1.40) 
-7.23* 
(-1.78) 
-4.41 
(-1.05) 
GDP growth -0.21 
(-1.26) 
-0.15 
(-0.75) 
-0.21 
(-1.65) 
-0.20 
(-1.50) 
-0.12 
(-1.36) 
-0.32** 
(-2.50) 
GDP per capita -0.42 
(-0.80) 
-0.47 
(-1.03) 
-0.49 
(-0.96) 
-0.47 
(-0.95) 
-0.57 
(-1.14) 
-0.36 
(-0.73) 
Tropical area -22.19** 
(-2.22) 
-35.99*** 
(-2.86) 
-18.37** 
(-2.21) 
-20.18* 
(-1.79) 
-18.44* 
(-1.93) 
-22.02** 
(-2.03) 
Distance to coastline -17.61*** 
(-7.11) 
-15.41*** 
(-6.93) 
-17.34*** 
(-6.91) 
-17.37*** 
(-7.34) 
-15.10*** 
(-5.39) 
-16.86** 
(-2.17) 
Ethnic fractionalization 13.56* 
(1.75) 
8.49 
(1.50) 
15.31** 
(2.40) 
15.10** 
(2.44) 
19.03*** 
(4.40) 
13.14 
(1.13) 
War 6.49 
(1.48) 
6.16 
(1.26) 
6.63 
(1.49) 
7.01 
(1.32) 
6.91 
(0.88) 
4.75 
(1.37) 
Transition country 14.77 
(1.19) 
12.93 
(0.96) 
17.81* 
(1.78) 
16.10 
(1.18) 
17.19 
(1.48) 
17.54 
(1.48) 
Number of observations 143 135 143 143 143 142 
Number of countries 43 40 43 43 43 42 
R² 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.43 0.42 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
5.02 
 
4.92 
 
5.13 
 
5.08 
 
4.99 
 
4.94 
F-statistic 6.70*** 7.20*** 6.67*** 6.59*** 7.41*** 7.08*** 
Hausman test 6.39 5.14 3.60 3.95 1.78 4.14 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
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Table 5. Regressions to explain the employment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality 5.31 
(1.38) 
     
Judicial independence  3.11** 
(2.42) 
    
Impartial courts   -1.68 
(-0.61) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   3.36 
(0.97) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    1.32 
(0.65) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     3.01*** 
(5.01) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
2.21 
(0.45) 
2.87 
(0.60) 
4.37 
(0.92) 
2.14 
(0.40) 
3.40 
(0.76) 
3.92 
(0.94) 
Low top marginal tax rate 0.59 
(0.56) 
1.24 
(0.99) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
0.64 
(0.60) 
0.39 
(0.30) 
0.24 
(0.20) 
GDP growth 0.13* 
(1.96) 
0.11 
(1.52) 
0.14** 
(2.00) 
0.13** 
(2.01) 
0.13* 
(1.93) 
0.17** 
(2.36) 
GDP per capita 0.41*** 
(3.04) 
0.42*** 
(3.27) 
0.43*** 
(3.26) 
0.41*** 
(3.17) 
0.43*** 
(3.21) 
0.40*** 
(3.24) 
Tropical area 11.18*** 
(5.89) 
11.35*** 
(3.97) 
9.68*** 
(4.27) 
10.69*** 
(4.59) 
10.31*** 
(4.65) 
10.63*** 
(4.34) 
Distance to coastline 4.43* 
(1.78) 
3.95 
(1.20) 
4.19 
(1.63) 
4.34* 
(1.80) 
4.33* 
(1.71) 
4.35 
(1.63) 
Ethnic fractionalization -4.10** 
(-2.12) 
-3.79 
(-1.22) 
-4.87* 
(-1.97) 
-4.56* 
(-1.73) 
-4.52** 
(-2.37) 
-4.42** 
(-2.14) 
War 1.12 
(0.67) 
1.10 
(0.70) 
1.31 
(0.75) 
1.11 
(0.72) 
1.20 
(0.75) 
1.09 
(0.64) 
Transition country 3.06 
(1.20) 
2.81 
(0.90) 
2.08 
(0.80) 
3.05 
(1.15) 
2.36 
(0.75) 
2.30 
(0.92) 
Number of observations 201 191 201 201 201 200 
Number of countries 70 66 70 70 70 70 
R² 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
1.69 
 
1.65 
 
1.69 
 
1.68 
 
1.70 
 
1.70 
F-statistic 24.63*** 22.63*** 23.95*** 24.09*** 24.24*** 25.09*** 
Hausman test 1.92 1.98 2.33 1.28 2.14 2.28 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
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Table 6. Regressions to explain the female employment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality 2.99 
(0.50) 
     
Judicial independence  3.13* 
(1.75) 
    
Impartial courts   -0.71 
(-0.23) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   2.53 
(0.56) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    -4.12 
(-1.04) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     2.66*** 
(2.94) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
2.42 
(0.52) 
2.22 
(0.57) 
3.70 
(1.07) 
2.15 
(0.41) 
4.49 
(1.07) 
3.59 
(1.14) 
Low top marginal tax rate -0.59 
(-0.41) 
0.29 
(0.25) 
-0.61 
(-0.47) 
-0.39 
(-0.33) 
-0.22 
(-0.12) 
-0.87 
(-0.57) 
GDP growth 0.06 
(0.72) 
0.04 
(0.39) 
0.07 
(0.77) 
0.06 
(0.75) 
0.07 
(0.80) 
0.10 
(0.98) 
GDP per capita 0.54*** 
(3.44) 
0.54*** 
(3.56) 
0.55*** 
(3.54) 
0.54*** 
(3.64) 
0.55*** 
(3.40) 
0.52*** 
(3.61) 
Tropical area 10.26*** 
(7.95) 
10.65*** 
(7.43) 
9.30*** 
(12.55) 
10.01*** 
(7.00) 
8.31*** 
(10.74) 
10.08*** 
(10.43) 
Distance to coastline 6.22 
(1.58) 
6.05 
(1.20) 
6.10 
(1.58) 
6.19 
(1.65) 
5.78 
(1.37) 
6.23 
(1.44) 
Ethnic fractionalization -4.66 
(-1.41) 
-4.27 
(-0.79) 
-5.14 
(-1.45) 
-4.91 
(-1.33) 
-5.61 
(-1.30) 
-4.80 
(-1.26) 
War -0.07 
(-0.06) 
-0.13 
(-0.13) 
-0.06 
(-0.05) 
-0.18 
(-0.16) 
-0.38 
(-0.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.03) 
Transition country 8.34*** 
(4.01) 
8.07*** 
(2.61) 
7.78*** 
(3.10) 
8.44*** 
(3.78) 
8.10*** 
(2.80) 
7.79*** 
(3.45) 
Number of observations 197 187 197 197 197 196 
Number of countries 69 65 69 69 69 69 
R² 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
1.74 
 
1.68 
 
1.73 
 
1.72 
 
1.70 
 
1.72 
F-statistic 13.27*** 12.91*** 13.15*** 13.22*** 13.47*** 13.43*** 
Hausman test 5.84 4.40 6.57 4.22 8.97 4.26 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
 
 33 
Table 7. Regressions to explain the youth employment rate
a)
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Legal system quality 24.10*** 
(2.62) 
     
Judicial independence  15.11*** 
(21.33) 
    
Impartial courts   11.36** 
(2.32) 
   
Protection of intellectual 
property 
   10.88*** 
(3.03) 
  
No or little military 
interference 
    -17.45*** 
(-3.96) 
 
Integrity of the legal 
system 
     9.69** 
(2.46) 
Flexible labor market 
regulations 
24.26*** 
(5.89) 
24.84*** 
(5.97) 
25.57*** 
(6.48) 
23.09*** 
(6.60) 
28.39*** 
(11.29) 
28.97*** 
(9.41) 
Low top marginal tax rate 6.52** 
(2.59) 
7.16** 
(2.01) 
7.03*** 
(2.68) 
6.38** 
(2.49) 
6.30* 
(1.97) 
4.54 
(1.40) 
GDP growth 0.17 
(0.98) 
0.09 
(0.47) 
0.13 
(0.79) 
0.17 
(0.94) 
0.10 
(0.64) 
0.23 
(1.46) 
GDP per capita 0.16 
(0.39) 
0.22 
(0.60) 
0.23 
(0.57) 
0.21 
(0.54) 
0.23 
(0.60) 
0.17 
(0.41) 
Tropical area 28.99*** 
(4.07) 
26.59** 
(2.40) 
24.86*** 
(3.31) 
24.06** 
(2.47) 
14.66* 
(1.74) 
26.87*** 
(4.39) 
Distance to coastline 3.78 
(1.60) 
4.54 
(1.51) 
5.57* 
(1.91) 
5.89** 
(2.24) 
9.80*** 
(3.70) 
5.76** 
(2.24) 
Ethnic fractionalization -8.60 
(-1.24) 
-9.88 
(-1.38) 
-12.02* 
(-1.92) 
-11.89 
(-1.55) 
-18.15** 
(-2.60) 
-10.85 
(-1.52) 
War 3.59* 
(1.72) 
3.90** 
(2.38) 
2.87** 
(2.24) 
2.92** 
(2.00) 
4.14* 
(1.98) 
4.85* 
(1.83) 
Transition country -9.25 
(-1.28) 
-9.03 
(-1.08) 
-9.92 
(-1.34) 
-10.58 
(-1.15) 
-13.85 
(-1.57) 
-12.75 
(-1.57) 
Tertiary enrollment rate 2.66 
(0.59) 
1.59 
(0.29) 
3.36 
(0.58) 
1.58 
(0.33) 
3.27 
(0.51) 
5.33 
(0.77) 
Number of observations 138 133 138 138 138 138 
Number of countries 38 38 38 38 38 38 
R² 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.33 0.32 0.36 
Standard error of 
regression 
 
3.33 
 
3.34 
 
3.40 
 
3.17 
 
3.03 
 
3.22 
F-statistic 5.54*** 4.61*** 5.09*** 4.33*** 4.13*** 4.86*** 
Hausman test 15.34 10.78 18.11* 6.36 12.45 6.73 
 
a)
Feasible generalized least squares estimates with country-specific random effects (Swamy-Arora method). All 
regressions are based on data for the years 1995, 1996 and 2000 to 2003. The following variables were lagged by 
one year: „legal system quality‟, „judicial independence‟, „impartial courts‟, „protection of intellectual property‟, „no 
or little military interference‟, „integrity of the legal system‟, „flexible labor market regulations‟, „low top marginal 
tax rate‟, „GDP growth‟. Heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics in parentheses (White method). ***(**/*) denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%(5%/10%) level. All regressions also contain year dummies and a constant term. 
